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Policy Act87 can regulate activities that are perhaps beyond NEPA's
reach. Notice of such state regulation has already been taken by the
Fourth Circuit.8  The plaintiffs in Rucker could have resorted to these
state laws to enjoin the "leveling of the dunes" and the grant of the
state dredge and fill permit. With responsible local action, the state
EPA could have been enacted to force the compilation of an impact
statement for the Rucker project.89
The maturation and future vitality of NEPA may be endangered
by irritating retrogressions caused by unsuccessful attempts to apply it
in areas where it perhaps should not be used at all. Only in developing
and using the supplements and alternatives to NEPA, which already
exist in many states, can a truly comprehensive and unified body of en-
vironmental law-both state and federal-mature and gain strength.
By realizing that NEPA need not be alone, future Ruckers may be pre-
vented, and judicial determinations of whether NEPA does or does not
apply can be rendered less critical in many upcoming environmental
disputes.
WILLIAM P. FARTTHING, JR.
Federal Estate Tax--"Incidents of Ownership" in Group Life
Insurance, A Phrase Searching for Definition
Under section 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in-
surance on the life of a decedent is taxable to the extent that he pos-
sessed, at the time of his death, any "incidents of ownership" in the
dredge and fill statute, allows "any property owner whose property may be damaged"
by the granting of a dunes permit a right of appeal to the Board of County Commis-
sioners. Under section 104B-10, the Commissioners' action is "subject to review by
the superior court of the county by proceedings in the nature of certiorari." The dunes
legislation is intended to prevent any damage that "will not materially weaken the
dune or reduce its effectiveness as a means of protection from the effects of high wind
and water. . . ." Id. § 104B-5. The fact that defendant Willis was able to completely
level his dunes bespeaks the weakness of the dunes statute. The statute is in line
for a substantial strengthening by the North Carolina General Assembly, however.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1973).
88. Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-8, -9 (Supp. 1973). By vote of the local gov-
erning body, the "action forcing" requirements of the state EPA, id. § 113A-4(2) (Supp.
1973), can be applied to local projects that are greater than two contiguous acres in
extent.
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policy.' Since the Code nowhere defines the phrase "incidents of own-
ership," the courts have been in the process of determining its mean-
ing since it was first used in the 1929 revision of the Regulations un-
der the 1918 Code.2 Recently the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner,3 gave the term what
may be its broadest meaning. The court held that the mere power to
alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the proceeds by the bene-
ficiaries was sufficient to constitute an incident of ownership. While
the result of the decision may not be far-reaching, both the court's con-
clusion and method of analysis seem to be logically inconsistent with
other recent decisions which have focused on the meaning of "inci-
dents of ownership."
At the time of his death James H. Lumpkin, Jr. was covered by a
non-contributory group term life insurance policy issued to his em-
ployer. The terms of the policy provided for the payment of a lump
sum of two hundred dollars immediately upon the employee's death
plus a series of monthly payments, in an amount equal to one half of the
employee's normal monthly compensation, to continue for a period de-
termined by the length of the employee's service with the employer.4
The beneficiaries of the policy were irrevocably fixed and were of three
classes. The wife of the employee, if living at the time of his death,
would receive the payments until they were exhausted or until her
death. If there were no surviving spouse, payments went to the next of
the classes, 5 who, like the spouse, would receive them until their ex-
haustion or the death of the beneficiary. If all beneficiaries in a
class died before the payments were exhausted, the remaining payments
did not accrue to the estate of any beneficiary but rather were paid to
members of the next class. Because there were only three classes of
beneficiaries and because payments terminated on the death of the
last of these, there was no assurance that any or all of the amount of
the proceeds would be paid by the insurer, and in no case would the
proceeds ever be payable to the estate of the insured.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2) provides, in pertinent part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any
incidents of ownership ....
2. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 27 (1929).
3. 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
4. Id. at 1094 n.5.
5. The next two clsses were children of the insured, under twenty-one years
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The insured possessed one substantive power over the proceeds of
the policy-he could elect an optional mode of payment to his spouse.
This option would reduce the amount of each monthly payment and
lengthen the period of time over which the payments would be made.6
For example, he could elect to have the payments reduced by one
half and paid for twice as long. In any case the total amount paid to
the spouse would remain the same. In .the event that the insured
elected this mode of settlement and the spouse died before the pay-
ments were exhausted, the estate of the spouse would receive the dif-
ference between the amount actually received and the amount which
would have been paid during that time at the higher rate of payment
had the option not been elected. Therefore, Lumpkin possessed only
the power to change the time at which the proceeds would be enjoyed;
he could not change the amount that any beneficiary (or the estate of
that beneficiary) would receive, nor could he exercise any power for
his own economic benefit.
The Tax Court held that the very limited power possessed by
Lumpkin was not a power to dispose of the property and was not an
appropriate subject of the estate tax.7 The court relied upon the lan-
guage of Treasury Regulations section 20.2042-1 (c) (2) and a 1937
case, May Billings,8 which had held that options as to the modes of
settlement that were much broader than were involved in Lumpkin did
not amount to a "control of the proceeds" and therefore did not result
in inclusion.'
The court of appeals reversed. Noting that the Code does not
define the term "incidents of ownership," the court examined the con-
gressional committee reports'0 that accompanied the enactment of the
first predecessor to section 2042.11 The reports listed illustrative kinds
of rights comprehended by the phrase: "the right of the insured- tor the
economic benefits of the policy, the right to change beneficiaries, the
right to surrender or cancel the policy, the right to assign the policy, the
right to pledge the policy for a loan, and others."' 2 The court inferred
of age or permanently incapable of self-support, and parents of the insured. Id. at
1093.
6. Id. at 1094 n.5.
7. Estate of James H. Lumpkin, Jr., 56 T.C. 815, 824 (1971).
8. 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937).
9. Id. at 1152.
10. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942); S. REP'. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942).
11. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 798, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122.
12. 474 F.2d at 1095, referring to authorities cited note 1CV upra.
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from this list that Congress intended to tax the value of life insurance
proceeds over which the insured at the time of his death still possessed a
"substantial degree of control."'" The inference was strengthened in
the eyes of the court by recognition of the congressional intent to give
life insurance policies estate tax treatment roughly equivalent to that
afforded other types of property under related sections of the Code.
14
The Commissioner relied upon two relatively more recent cases to
offset the impact of Billings. The first of these, Lober v. United
States,'5 held that the forerunner to section 203811 required inclusion
of the value of the trusts in gross estate where the decedent had created
several irrevocable trusts for the benefit of his children but had re-
tained, as trustee, a power to accelerate the remainder. In Lober the
taxpayer argued that because under state law the beneficiaries had a
vested interest in the trust proceeds the power retained by the decedent
was not a power to "alter, amend or revoke," but the Supreme Court
concluded that the beneficiaries were granted no present right to
immediate enjoyment of the trust property and that the degree of con-
trol retained by Lober was sufficient to result in inclusion.
In United States v. O'Malley'7 the decedent had created several
irrevocable trusts for the benefit of members of his family. As one of
the trustees, he retained the power to pay the trust income to the ben-
eficiaries or to accumulate it and add it to the principal, in which case
the beneficiaries' enjoyment of the income could be postponed and be
conditioned upon their surviving the termination of the trusts. The
Supreme Court held that this power to alter the time and manner of
enjoyment was significant and sufficient to invoke the predecessor to
section 2036.18
13. 474 F.2d at 1095.
14. See INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§ 2036 (transfers with retained life estate),
2037 (transfers taking effect at death), 2038 (revocable transfers), 2041 (powers of
appointment).
The only authority cited for this proposition is Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed at text accompanying notes 34-46 infra.
15. 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 122 [hereinafter cited
as Int. Rev. Code of 1939].
17. 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c)(1)(B)(ii). Actually the O'Malley case
dealt specifically with the issue of whether the decedent had ever "transferred" the
trust income. The proposition for which the case was cited in Lumpkin was deemed
by the O'Malley court to have been decided in Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes,
326 U.S. 480 (1946), and nothing in the O'Malley decision added to or detracted
from the proposition adopted in Holmes that the type of power held by the decedent
[Vol. 52
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Based on these cases, the Lumpkin court concluded that the power
to alter the time and manner of enjoyment gives its holder a substan-
tial degree of control, at least for purposes of sections 2036 and 2038.
In view of the congressional intent to make the estate tax treatment of
life insurance proceeds similar to that of other types of property, the
court felt it would be anomalous to hold that such a power is not also
an incident of ownership within the meaning of section 2042. In the
view of the Lumpkin court, the only significant distinction between
sections 2036 and 2038, on the one hand, and section 2042, on the
other, is that the former require an incomplete transfer while under the
later a transfer is unnecessary. Thus sections 2036 and 2038 deal with
powers retained19 by the decedent over property that he initially trans-
ferred, while under section 2042 the decedent at death need merely
possess an incident of ownership. The means by which he came into
possession was considered irrelevant. 20  Lumpkin found that this dis-
tinction does not imply any further differences among the sections as to
the degree of power the decedent must hold over the property in order
to render its value includible in his gross estate. Accordingly, the court
held that Lumpkin possessed an "incident of ownership" in the in-
surance policy.
The court concluded by stating that Lumpkin could have assigned
the right to select the optional modes of settlement, divesting himself
of the power and thereby avoiding the estate tax on the proceeds.
Arguably, Lumpkin will have little practical effect upon those who
are covered by group term life insurance policies. A recent comment"-
points out that it should be relatively simple for employers who are con-
cerned with the estate tax consequences of the decision to re-write the
insurance policies so as to require their employees to make an irrevo-
cable designation of the mode of settlement and thereby divest the in-
sured of the power. However, the court's suggestion that the employee
in that case was significant. Indeed the Lumpkin court's reliance on O'Malley in
this context is completely misleading. It is arguable that Lober, which also relied
strongly upon Holmes, added nothing to the law in this regard and that the mere
ability to determine the time and manner of enjoyment of transferred property had
been held to be sufficient to result in inclusion in the gross estate of the transferee
as early as 1946. The significance of this possibility is discussed at text accompanying
note 54 infra.
19. This interpretation of section 2038 is not consistent with the literal wording
of that provision, but does appear to be consistent with the interpretation given the
section by the Second Circuit in Skirter, discussed at text accompanying notes 34-
46 infra.
20. 474 F.2d at 1097.
21. 10 HoUSTON L. REV. 984, 96 (1973).
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assign the right to select the optional modes of settlement is potentially
dangerous. The cases clearly indicate that if such an assignment is
made solely for the purpose of avoiding the estate tax and the insured
dies within three years of the assignment, section 2035 (transfers
made in contemplation of death) will operate to include the value of
the proceeds.22
The estate tax treatment of life insurance on the life of the dece-
dent payable to other beneficiaries has had a varied history. 28 Life in-
surance is one of the only forms of property given special treatment
in a separate Code section and when section 2042(2) is compared to re-
lated sections of the Code it is apparent that life insurance is treated very
differently from other property. 24  Some commentators view the IRS
attitude toward life insurance as unfavorable; 25 it certainly appears that
the Service has been attempting to push the definition of "incidents of
ownership" to the outer limits in recent cases. 26 The broad inter-
pretation given to the phrase by the Lumpkin court, therefore, will be
important in two respects. Those who favor a more lenient estate
tax treatment of life insurance will see it as potentially dangerous prece-
dent and those who take the opposite view will be concerned that the
22. See, e.g., Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1947); Vanderlip v. Com-
missioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1946); First Trust & Deposit Co. v. Shaughnessy,
134 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1943).
23. See generally C. LowNDEs & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GiFr TAxEs
ch. 13 (1962); 2 J. MaRTENs, Tim LAw o FEDERAL GiFF AND EsTATE TAxAiiON
§ 17 (1959). Courts have held the following powers to be incidents of ownership:
the power to change the beneficiary or assign the policy, Commissioner v. Noel, 380
U.S. 678 (1965); the power to surrender or cancel the policy, Commissioner v. Tregan-
owan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); the power to borrow
against the policy from the insurer, Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa.
1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 150 (3rd Cir. 1953). However, it has been held that the
power to terminate group life insurance solely by terminating employment is not an
incident of ownership; see Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. CI. 1969);
Estate of James H. Lumpkin, Jr., 56 T.C. 815 (1971); Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 Cum.
BuLL. 307.
24. See Lowndes, An Introduction to The Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 44
N.C.L. REv. 1, 13 (1965).
25. Wilson, Equal Treatment for Life Insurance, 112 TRusTs & ESTATEs 270
(1973).
26. In Estate of James H. Lumpkin, Jr., 56 T.C. 815 (1971), the Commissioner
argued that not only the power to select the optional mode of settlement but also
the power to cancel the insurance by terminating employment, the power to convert
the policy upon termination of employment, and the power to assign all rights under
the policy were incidents of ownership. The court rejected all of these arguments
and they were not pursued on appeal. In Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461
(Ct. Cl. 1969), the Commissioner had also been unsuccessful in these arguments. Rev.
Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 307, reflects the acceptance by the I.R.S. of the
proposition that the power to cancel group term life insurance by terminating employ-
ment is not an incident of ownership.
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decision does not deal with some of the arguments which will be raised,
as they have been in prior cases, to support a more limited definition
of "incidents of ownership."
Two other recent cases which have focused on the meaning of the
term "incidents of ownership" illustrate a different approach from that
taken by the court in Lumpkin and reach a result which seems to
be logically inconsistent with it. In Estate of Fruehauf v. Commis-
sioner27 the wife of the decedent had owned certain insurance policies
on her husband's life. However, she predeceased him by fourteen
months, leaving a will that established a trust to which the life in-
surance policies passed. As co-executor of the wife's estate and co-
trustee of the trust, Fruehauf had powers in a fiduciary capacity over
the insurance policies which would clearly have been incidents of own-
ership under other circumstances. The Tax Court held that the pro-
ceeds were includable in Fruehauf's gross estate. 28  It rejected the con-
tention that the capacity in which the powers are held should be signifi-
cant in determining whether they were sufficient to constitute incidents
of ownership.29
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but the court rejected what it termed
a "broad per se rule" that possession of powers sufficient to consti-
tute incidents of ownership would always result in the inclusion of the
proceeds of policies, regardless of the fact that the powers were held
in a fiduciary capacity. 30 The court focused on the fact that where
the decedent was a transferee of the powers but could not exercise
them for his own economic benefit, such an arrangement can hardly be
construed as a substitute for testamentary disposition on the decedent's
part.31 The court then stated that the Tax Court had ignored the
fundamental nature of the fiduciary relationship, citing previous cases
which had recognized that the capacity in which incidents were held
was important.3 2 The Sixth Circuit concluded that since the decedent
was the lifetime beneficiary of the testamentary trust established by
his wife, he had the ability to exercise the powers in such a way as to give
himself the economic benefit of the life insurance. It was this dual
27. 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
28. Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
29. Id. at 926.
30. 427 F.2d at 83-84.
31. Id. at 84; cf. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 444 (1933); Commis-
sioner v. Chase Natl Bank, 82 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1936).
32. Estate of Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966); Estate of Newcomb Carlton,
34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir, 1962).
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position as fiduciary and beneficiary under the will and trust instrument
that gave Fruehauf incidents of ownership in the policies and required
inclusion of their proceeds in his gross estate.83
Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner4 dealt with a similar situation.
Here the decedent had owned the insurance policies but more than
three years before his death he had divested himself of all interest in
and power over them by assigning them to his wife. As in Fruehauf,
the wife had pre-deceased the insured and had left a will which set up
a trust containing the policies and naming the insured as trustee. Skif-
ter's powers as trustee were not so broad as those of Fruehauf since
Skifter could not exercise any power for his own economic benefit.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner argued that the decedent possessed inci-
dents of ownership in the policies and that they should be included in
his gross estate under section 2042(2). The Skifter court cited the
same list of examples of incidents of ownership which the Lumpkin
court had examined,s5 but in Skifter the court also noted the language
of Treasury Regulations section 20.2042-1 (c) (2) which read in part:
Generally speaking, the term [incidents of ownership] has
reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic
benefits of the policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the
beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy,
to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to ob-
tain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the
policy. .... so
This language is almost identical to that found in the congressional
committee reports, but there is an important distinction. The commit-
tee reports merely include the right to economic benefit from the pol-
icy as one example of powers and rights which might constitute inci-
dents of ownership, whereas the regulations state that an incident of
ownership has reference to the right to economic benefit and thus
includes several other rights and powers the possession of which argu-
ably constitutes a right to economic benefit.37  The court obviously
33. 427 F.2d at 86.
34. 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
35. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
36. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958).
37. Clearly the power to pledge the policy for a loan or to obtain a loan from
the insurer against the surrender value of the policy involves a right to economic
benefits from the policy. Whether the other rights and powers mentioned involve
economic benefits will depend upon the nature of the insurance and the terms of
the policy, e.g., unless the power to change the beneficiary is restricted it includes
the power to designate the estate of the insured as beneficiary, and this may be an
economic interest. Similarly, the power to assign the policy may be a right to eco-
[Vol. 52
1974] FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
focused upon the wording of the regulations because it found signif-
icant the fact that Skifter could not have exercised any of his powers
for his own economic benefit.
38
The predecessor to section 2042 provided that even if the dece-
dent divested himself of all interest in an insurance policy on his life,
the proceeds would still be included in his gross estate if he had con-
tinued to pay the premiums on the policy. 9 This provision was
dropped from the Code in 1954, and in the congressional comittee re-
ports40 accompanying the enactment of section 2042 the Skifter court
found language which indicated that in dropping the "payment of pre-
miums" test Congress intended to give life insurance treatment more
nearly equal to that afforded other types of property under the estate
tax.41  While recognizing that this legislative history was hardly con-
clusive, the court felt that it gave support to the argument that in de-
fining "incidents of ownership" the courts should examine the treat-
ment given other property under sections 2036, 2037, and 2038.
Treasury Regulation section 20.2042(c) (4) provides, in part
A decedent is considered to have an "incident of ownership"
in an insurance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms
of the policy [he] . . . has the power [as trustee or otherwise] to
change the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or
nomic benefit if the nature of the policy is such that an assignment would have any
value. It is difficult to determine what significance should be attached to this differ-
ence in wording between the committee reports and the Treasury Regulations. See
Note, Estate Taxation of Life Insurance Policies Held by the Insured as Trustee, 32
MD. L. REV. 305, 310 n.23 (1972).
38. 468 F.2d at 702. There is support in the cases for the proposition that
incidents of ownership refer to a right to economic benefits from the policy; see,
e.g., Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929); Prichard v. United
States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d
231 (5th Cir. 1958). But see United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d
7, 11 (1st Cir. 1966), discussed in note 50 infra.
39. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 798.
40. The committee stated that the '"payment of premiums" test was dropped be-
cause no other type of property was subject to the estate tax where the decedent
purchased it but gave it away long before his death "and because to discriminate
against life insurance in this regard is not justified." The 1954 Code also incorporated
into section 2042(2) the section 2037 rule that a reversionary interest in the property
qualifies for inclusion if the value of the interest exceeds five per cent of the value
of the property; this was done to place "life insurance policies in an analogous position
to other property. ... ." S. REP. No., 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954).
41. 468 F.2d at 702. The court found additional support for the proposition
that life insurance was intended to receive treatment similar to that afforded other
types of property in the fact that the interests and powers which Congress included
as examples of incidents of ownership were similar to those which would result in
inclusion of other property under other sections of the Code.
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the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the dece-
dent has no beneficial interest in the trust.42
The Skifter court agreed with the Tax Court" that if this section
were given its broadest reading it would conflict with Regulation
section 20.2042(c) (2), but it rejected a broad reading where the de-
cedent had possessed no power to benefit himself or his estate.44
Although the Second Circuit agreed that section 2042 should be
read in light of related sections of the Code and recognized that the
literal language of section 2038 provides that the section will result in
taxation "without regard to when or from what source the decedent
acquired" the power, it pointed out that the legislative history of that
language indicated it was intended to apply only to the situation where
the decedent himself created a power in someone else at the time of
transfer and which later devolved upon him before his death. 45
The court concluded that because none of the other code sections
would have taxed the policies had they been other property and be-
cause Congress did not intend to discriminate between life insurance
and other forms of property the powers possessed by Skifter at his
death did not constitute incidents of ownership. 46
There is apparent disparity between the holdings in Lumpkin on
the one hand and Fruehauf and Skifter on the other. The disparity
might best be characterized in terms of the dichotomy between the
inference in Lumpkin that any significant power over the proceeds of
an insurance policy alone constitutes an incident of ownership and the
implicit recognition in Fruehauf and Skifter that there is a further test
which must be applied-that certain powers are not within the purview
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042(c)(4) (1958).
43. Estate of Hector R. Skifter, 56 T.C. 1190, 1198 (1971).
44. 468 F.2d at 703. There appear to be three alternative ways in which Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) may be reconcilable with § 20.2042-1(c) (2). First, the lan-
guage of (c) (2) which reads "generally speaking . . . economic benefits" does not
preclude the possibility of non-beneficial interests. Second, (c) (4) may be read as
applying only to the situation where the decedent retains powers over policies trans-
ferred in trust. Third, since (c) (4) is the only section of the regulations which speaks
of policies held in trust the section may apply only to a policy which is placed in
trust regardless of whether the insured retained the power or himself made the transfer
to the trust. The Skiter courts considered only the first and second possible construc-
tions-the third alternative, if accepted, would have governed in Skifter. This analysis
of Treas. Reg. § 20.2042(p)(4) is found in an excellent criticism of the opinion of
the Skifter court: Note, 32 MD. L. Rav., supra note 37, at 309.
45. 468 F.2d at 705. This interpretation of section 2038 is subject to criticism,
see Note, 32 MD. L. REv., supra note 37, at 313-18. The Lumpkin court, however,
seems to have accepted this interpretation, see note 14 supra.
46. 468 F.2d at 705.
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of the "incidents of ownership" test, even though they may give the
insured very real control over the policy or its proceeds.
One aspect of the latter viewpoint would certainly be the focus of
the Tax Court in Lumpkin on the de minimis nature of the right held
by the decedent. There are some powers which the insured may
possess which give him such a small degree of control that they have
been held to be insufficient to constitute incidents of ownership even
though they are certainly property rights in the broad meaning of the
term.
47
Another aspect of this test involves the recognition that the
source of the power in question is significant. If the reasoning of
Fruehauf and Skifter is accepted it might well be concluded that Lump-
kin was as much the transferee of the power which he held as were the
decedents in those two cases. The language of section 2042(2) pro-
vides that taxation will result where the decedent "possessed" an inci-
dent of ownership, but this language did not preclude the Fruehauf or
Skifter court's examination of the source of the power.
Perhaps more important is the Lumpkin court's failure to deal con-
vincingly with the argument that an incident of ownership refers to a
right to economic benefits from the insurance. As attorneys for the
taxpayer argued in their brief,48 there is a long line of cases equating
incidents of ownership with beneficial interest.4" This was certainly
important in both Fruehauf and Skifter, and might well be one line
of demarcation in a proper definition of "incidents of ownership."
Because the Lumpkin decision departs from this trend, the court
would have done well to treat the issue directly, and they would have
found some support in a few cases which have rejected the argument
that lack of beneficial interest will always prevent a power from being
an incident of ownership."0
47. See note 26 supra.
48. Brief for Appellee at 11, Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1973).
49. See cases cited note 38 supra.
50. See United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11 (1st
Cir. 1966). This case was mentioned in the opinion of the Tax Court in Skifter
but was found to deal with an entirely different kind of situation and to offer only
superficial support to the contention of the government that an incident of ownership
need not give the insured the right to economic benefits from the policy. 56 T.C.
at 1198 n.2.
The court might also have examined Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) in light of
the analysis contained in note 44 supra. If the court had accepted the first alternative
discussed there and used that interpretation of the Regulation to bolster its rejection
of the contention that an incident of ownership always refers to a beneficial interest,
1974]
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Neither the Skifter nor Lumpkin courts found conclusive support
for the proposition that Congress intended, in enacting the 1954 Code,
to give life insurance more nearly equal treatment to that afforded other
types of property. As mentioned previously, the only support which
the court in Skirter found for this proposition was the language of the
congressional committee reports dealing with the dropping of the pay-
ment of premiums test, 51 and the Lumpkin opinion cites only Skirter
as authority. As a general proposition, the validity of the inference by
the Skifter court from the language of the reports may have some
merit,5" but in the context of Lumpkin it is open to serious question.
The Billings decision had been acquiesced in by the Commissioner in
1937,5 and this acquiescence was outstanding at the time of the Lump-
kin decision. The Lober case cited by the Lumpkin court was handed
down in 1953, and the proposition for which O'Malley was cited in
Lumpkin had actually been decided in 1946.r4 Since the Supreme
Court had determined before the enactment of the 1954 Code that the
mere power to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of transferred
property was sufficient to result in inclusion under the forerunners to
sections 2036 and 2038, it might be argued that had Congress in-
tended to apply the same test to incidents of ownership, it would have
done so directly rather than in the vague wording in a congressional
committee report, and that since it had not done so the Billings deci-
sion should stand.
However, assuming that Congress did intend to make the estate
tax treatment of life insurance more nearly parallel to that given other
types of property under related sections of the Code, the Lumpkin de-
cision may be subject to even more criticism. The entire scheme of
the federal estate tax rests upon the basis of a tax on the privilege of
transferring property at death coupled with "taxes upon other types of
transfers that have some of the aspects of a testamentary transfer and
would otherwise be resorted to in order to escape a tax limited to
strictly testamentary transfers." 55 Thus in interpreting section 2042 and
related sections of the Code the courts should consider whether the
this argument, coupled with the language from the Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co.
opinion would have been a much more persuasive method of dealing with a concept
on which has been founded the rejection of many of the Government's attempts to
include non-beneficial powers as incidents of ownership.
51. Note 40 supra.
52. See Note, 32 MD. L. REV., supra note 37, at 306 n.25.
53. 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 3, withdrawn, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 3.
54. Note 18 supra.
55. Lowndes, supra note 24, at 4.
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transfer or power at issue appears to be a "substitute for testamentary
disposition of property."'56
An examination of the Code will reveal that with the exception
of sections 2040, 2041 and 2042, all of the sections require that the
decedent have made an incomplete transfer of the property, which
necessarily implies that he have had beneficial interest in it. Section
2040 taxes jointly held property to the extent that the consideration for
it was furnished by the decedent, and thus reaches a situation where the
decedent transferred property which he owned in exchange for property
which is held jointly. Section 2041 taxes property over which the de-
cedent had a general power of appointment-a power exercisable
for the benefit of himself or his estate. It is thus apparent that section
2042 is the only section which can be read to reach property which
the decedent neither owned nor had any beneficial interest in and over
which he never had any power exercisable for his own benefit or that
of his estate.57 Since Congress has rejected the contention that life in-
surance is inherently testamentary, 5 it seems only logical that if Con-
gress did intend to remove the discriminatory aspects of life insurance
taxation under the Code, it intended that an incident of ownership be
equated with the right to economic benefits of the policy. If this in-
terpretation is given to the phrase, an incident of ownership may be
seen as similar to an incomplete transfer of the property (in the situa-
tion where the insured has beneficial interest in the property but trans-
fers it, retaining a life estate, power to revoke, etc.) or a general power
of appointment (where the decedent never owned the policy but was
given a power exercisable for the benefit of himself or his estate).
By equating the nature of the power required under sections
2036 and 2038 with that required by section 2042 but ignoring the
distinctions between the types of property involved, the Lumpkin court
reached a decision which is clearly contrary to what the court itself
saw as congressional intent. The court also failed to read correctly the
focus of the Skifter opinion which it cited as authority for this view of
56. See Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 444 (1933); Commissioner v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 82 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1936); H.R. REv. No. 767, 65th Cong.,
2d Sess. 22 (1919).
57. Certainly the insured may have possessed a beneficial interest in a life in-
surance policy, and in the case where he purchases the policy himself and later trans-
fers it, it is difficult to distinguish this form of property from any other with respect
to its treatment under the estate tax. Only in the case of an insured who did not
himself purchase the insurance, such as in the group life insurance situation, is the
Lumpkin court's result obviously discriminatory toward life insurance.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd'Cong., 2d Sess. A316-17, B14-15 (1954).
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congressional intent, for Skifter had asked whether the property would
be taxed under other sections of the code if it were not life insurance,
not whether the power held by the decedent would have been sufficient
under those sections to result in inclusion. This distinction is criti-
cal, for the former statement of the issues requires the court to examine,
in addition to the nature of the power, the source of the power, the
way in which it is held, and whether the arrangement is a substitute for
testamentary disposition of the property.
Implicit in the Lumpkin court's decision is the view that even
though life insurance is not always inherently testamentary, it has tes-
tamentary characteristics which may justify taxation in situations where
other forms of property would not be taxed. Whether this premise is
valid is open to question in view of the refusal of Congress to treat life
insurance as inherently testamentary, but even if the premise is accepted
the court did little to provide guidelines for applying it to other situa-
tions. The factors which other courts have viewed as important in de-
fining "incidents of ownership" are neither integrated into the Lump-
kin result nor rejected outright; this should allow wide latitude for
other courts to distinguish the decision.
Lumpkin is an apparent success for the contention of the Service
that powers sufficient to result in inclusion under other sections of the
Code are sufficient to constitute incidents of ownership, but it does little
to provide a workable definition of "incidents of ownership" and may
only inject more confusion into this unsettled area of the law.
STEVEN KROPELNICKI, JR.
Federal Income Tax-Internal Revenue Code Sections 167 and
263-Depreciation on Depreciation?
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the taxpayer
a deduction from gross income for depreciation of certain property used
in his business.' Section 263 forbids the deduction of any amounts
1. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 167, provides in part:
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reason-
able allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
Prior versions of section 167, applicable to cases discussed in the text, are compara-
ble.
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